We Often Attribute 'understanding' And Other Cognitive

Well, What Does "good" Mean Anyway? As Wittgenstein Suggested, "good," Like "game," Has A Family Of Meanings. Prominent Among Them Is This One: "meets The Criteria Or Standards Of Assessment Or Evaluation."

Where Conscious Subjectivity Is Concerned, There Is No Distinction Between The Observation And The Thing Observed.

We Often Attribute 'understanding' And Other Cognitive Predicates By Metaphor And Analogy To Cars, Adding Machines, And Other Artifacts, But Nothing Is Proved By Such Attributions.

It Seems To Me Obvious That Infants And Many Animals That Do Not In Any Ordinary Sense Have A Language Or Perform Speech Acts Nonetheless Have Intentional States. Only Someone In The Grip Of A Philosophical Theory Would Deny That Small Babies Can Literally Be Said To Want Milk And That Dogs Want To Be Let Out Or Believe That Their Master Is At The Door.

The Problem Posed By Indirect Speech Acts Is The Problem Of How It Is Possible For The Speaker To Say One Thing And Mean That But Also To Mean Something Else.