Language Is A Social Art.

If There Is A Case For Mental Events And Mental States, It Must Be That The Positing Of Them, Like The Positing Of Molecules, Hassome Indirect Systematic Efficacy In The Development Of Theory.

Unlike Descartes, We Own And Use Our Beliefs Of The Moment, Even In The Midst Of Philosophizing, Until By What Is Vaguely Called Scientific Method We Change Them Here And There For The Better. Within Our Own Total Evolving Doctrine, We Can Judge Truth As Earnestly And Absolutely As Can Be, Subject To Correction, But That Goes Without Saying.

We Must Not Leap To The Fatalistic Conclusion That We Are Stuck With The Conceptual Scheme That We Grew Up In. We Can Change It, Bit By Bit, Plank By Plank, Though Meanwhile There Is Nothing To Carry Us Along But The Evolving Conceptual Scheme Itself. The Philosopher's Task Was Well Compared By Neurath To That Of A Mariner Who Must Rebuild His Ship On The Open Sea.

For Me The Problem Of Induction Is A Problem About The World: A Problem Of How We, As We Are Now (by Our Present Scientific Lights), In A World We Never Made, Should Stand Better Than Random, Or Coin-tossing Chances Changes Of Coming Out Right When We Predict By Inductions. . . .

A Curious Thing About The Ontological Problem Is Its Simplicity. It Can Be Put Into Three Anglo-saxon Monosyllables: 'what Is There?' It Can Be Answered, Moreover, In A Word--'everything'--and Everyone Will Accept This Answer As True.